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PSYCHOANALYSIS AS THE
PATIENT: HIGH IN FEELING,
LOW IN ENERGY
This paper examines the increasingly important role that affect is assuming
in psychoanalytic research and practice. This rise in the centrality of affect
has been at the expense of an independent role for motivation and a dis-
missal of any energy concept. Difficulties with this affect-first approach are
identified and an alternative offered that accords motivation an independent
role and accommodates a useful energy concept. Research on esophageal
atresia, addiction, and infant suckling are cited in support of this position.
In recent years two trends have developed in psychoanalytic thinkingthat have affinities with current developments in psychology: (1) the
conceptual and clinical dominance assumed by affect; and (2) the apparent
disappearance of anything comparable to an energy concept. These two
developments taken together, I will argue, effectively deny motivation,
let alone drives, any independent role in psychoanalytic theory.
Nevertheless, the energy concept, far from being discarded, is in fact
incorporated into affect in various guises, with unhappy consequences.
To construct an affect-first theory, the concept of drive is replaced
by the concept of physiological need having no a psychological or
experiential standing until linked to an affect elicited by an object.
Thus, affect-imbrued object relations are established as the initial
building blocks of psychological being.
Three problems are created by this approach: (1) given that most
physiological needs are psychologically silent (e.g., electrolyte
imbalance), affect-first theories fail to explain why certain physio-
logical needs (and not others) do become linked to affects and thus
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independent factor, these theories fail to account for psychological
agency, which becomes at best a derivative of early object relations
development; and (3) although these theories posit dramatic transfor-
mations in development as a function of vicissitudes in early object rela-
tions, they cannot account for the passage from one stage to another
because they lack a true energy concept.
I will offer alternative formulations based on considering motiva-
tion as independent of affects from the beginning of life and as consti-
tuting the basis of psychological agency. The energy concept will be
revisited and shown to play a crucial role in any theory of psycho-
logical transformation.
In a concluding section, I will adduce evidence from empirical
studies supporting the position that motivation must be considered
independent of affect and that significant neonatal psychological devel-
opments occur in the absence of a responding object, thus pointing to
the earliest, non–object-dependent origin of psychological agency.
TWO REPRESENTATIVE AFFECT-FIRST THEORIES:
KERNBERG AND LICHTENBERG
I will start by quoting a number of diverse theoreticians for whom
affect is central:
I view affects as the primary motivators of behavior [Kernberg l988,
p. 3l9].
[The] sexual drive . . . derives its motivational power not from any
energy but from the affects it triggers [Lichtenberg l989, p. 224].
anxiety and guilt [are] the affects responsible for initiating conflict
[Brenner l976, p. 11].
“drives” or other mental “contents” are not intrinsically dangerous but
become so only when associated with one or another dysphoric feeling
[Schwartz l988, p. 36l].
[An emotion is] an integrated unit of experience consisting of (l) a dis-
tinctive perception; (2) an implicit wish and implied action (motive);
(3) a typical expression (facial and/or postural) that is species-specific
and in man is culturally adapted [Dahl l979, p. 211].
our affective core touches upon these aspects of experience which are
most important to us as individuals because it organizes both meaning
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and motivation; it also allows us to get in touch with the uniqueness of
our own (and others’) experience . . . [Emde l988, p. 32].
These quotations, which have in common a major emphasis on the
centrality of affect—even to the point at which affects are considered
the cause of motives—come from sources, across the range of psycho-
analytic thinking, from the structural theory to object relations to self
psychology. Included are authors who are primarily clinicians and
others who are primarily researchers. Affect, then, is an underlying
theme cutting across theoretical perspectives. Schwartz proposes that
the drives themselves, or for that matter any mental content, are not “in-
trinsically dangerous” and become so only by virtue of the affect asso-
ciated with them. The classical conception of the four danger situa-
tions—loss of object, loss of love, castration anxiety, and loss of
self-regard—are not “intrinsically” dangerous, according to this view,
but become so only by association with distressing affects.
Our feelings are obviously significant players in experience, but it
is not immediately clear what determines that a given circumstance will
constitute a species-wide danger. We think we know what these dangers
are, but do they become dangers only because they make us feel anx-
ious? Freud reasoned that the loss of the object, for example, creates
anxiety because it leaves the infant in a state of helplessness with
respect to its needs. It wanted mother because it needed mother. This is
the so-called anaclitic position, about which more later. The abandoned
infant is left in a state of wanting, or what I would prefer to call crav-
ing, that I will also say more about later.
Now, I know it would be fatuous to contend that the infant is aware
in a fully propositional sense that “if mother is not around my needs will
not be met and that makes me anxious.” But is it aware only of anxiety,
or does it also experience a wanting, a desiring, a craving that remains
ungratified? To anticipate a later issue, does the infant at the start experi-
ence only affects, and not its needs in the form of wants or cravings?
It is apparent from the quotations I have marshaled that the central
experience of human beings is to be equated with feelings. This is most
explicitly apparent in Dahl’s definition of emotion, which incorporates
cognitive, motivational, and expressive aspects. 
In the quotation from Lichtenberg we notice still another significant
tendency in current thinking: the sexual drive itself, Lichtenberg tells
us, derives its motivational power not from any energy, but from the
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affects it triggers. Of interest in this formulation is that the sexual drive
is depicted as essentially lacking in any strength of its own; rather, it
must borrow its strength from the affects it manages to “trigger.”
Not only is the danger situation defined by the associated affect, as
we saw in the Schwartz quote, but motivational strength is itself a func-
tion of affect, as we can see from Lichtenberg’s statement. We do not
know how much we want something until we know how strongly we
feel about it—on the face of it, a reasonable and not unusual surmise.
Yet there is an intriguing dual role assigned the sexual drive by
Lichtenberg: the drive first triggers the affect and then is swelled in
strength by its intensity. When later I go into Lichtenberg’s ideas in
greater detail, we will see that the sexual “trigger” is a “physiological
need” that does not take on a psychological status as a motive until
amplified by the affect it triggers.
Let me briefly summarize what I would like to draw from these
quotes. In the view of quite a few psychoanalytically oriented thinkers,
affects (1) are the primary motivators of behavior, (2) provide motiva-
tion its urgency and strength, and (3) define what is psychologically
dangerous.
Paralleling this development in psychoanalytic thinking is a quite
similar development in psychology at large. In fact, one theoretician in
particular—Silvan Tomkins (1962, l963)—serves as the bridge
between these developments. Broadly speaking, what has been happen-
ing in psychology is that motivation is absorbed within the framework
of belief or judgment, on the one hand, or of affect, on the other. In
social cognitive psychology, the concepts of schema and self-schema
figure importantly (see Shevrin 1989). For some social cognitive theo-
rists, motives are defined as goals considered to be subsystems within
schemata. Thus, to use one kind of example, the restaurant/eating
schema incorporates the goal to eat. That goal is the motive for the act
of going to the restaurant and eating. But if we bear in mind that a
schema is a representation of some previous set of feelings, wishes, and
actions now currently active, then it is clear that this conception is tan-
tamount to imagining that a sign saying “Eat! Restaurant This Way” is
a motive for going to the restaurant and eating. What I mean to say is
that a schema is a signifier, an abstract signifier at that, while a goal 
is simply a further elaboration of that signifier that need not itself con-
stitute a motive for any behavior, let alone eating. We may go to a
restaurant, sit down, and not eat. It depends on whether we are hungry,
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or on what other psychological vicissitudes the need for food has
encountered in the course of our development.
The concept of conation (i.e., motive, impulse, drive) appears to be
incorporated within the enlarged boundaries of affect or feeling. Again,
perhaps the most influential theorist in psychology championing the
primacy of affects is Tomkins, according to whom affects serve to
amplify needs. Without this amplification, the latter would be of little
significance to us. It is clear that Tomkins wishes to assert that affects,
as inborn proclivities, are the means through which our physiological
needs are endowed with importance, so that we learn to pursue them in
order to bring about pleasurable affects. Lichtenberg explicitly
acknowledges his debt to Tomkins.
For several of the authors quoted there is an interesting and curious
implicit distinction made between needs on the one hand and motives
on the other. Needs are defined more or less as particular biological,
physical imbalances that acquire psychological significance through the
offices of affects, which are therefore regarded as progenitors of motiva-
tion in its strictly psychological meaning. I will later go into greater
detail as to how this is meant to work. For now, however, let us ask what
is gained by placing affects in so central a role. Affects would seem to
be much more readily observable and communicable than either needs
or motives. In research on infancy, affects are reported to be the
phenomena most evident to observers. Affects seem both tangible and
powerful. And yet, could this salience attributed to affects in truth reflect
a theoretical bias? Is it not also the case that we just as readily attribute
wants to the infant when we say, observing a distressed child, that it
wants to be fed or changed? But it is nonetheless true that the same affect
state may be prompted by different wants, so that affects are more
invariant than wants and thus offer themselves as more reliable. Let us
now examine the difficulties attending this emphasis on affects.
I believe there are several. To start with, an entire class of experi-
ences—described with words like wanting, desiring, craving, and
wishing—is accorded no independent standing but rather is regarded
simply as a feature of affects. But on what basis, it may be asked, other
than the purely subjective, could one support the view that these experi-
ences are in fact separate and independent psychological phenomena?
Here I think psychoanalysis can be of some help. When we speak of
gratifying or frustrating an impulse, are we talking about affects? Do we
speak of gratifying a feeling, or frustrating a feeling? It seems to me it
845
does violence to both the concept of feeling and the concepts of gratifi-
cation and frustration to so join them. We may speak of experiencing,
expressing, or suppressing a feeling, but it is hard to imagine gratifying
or frustrating a feeling. Even in describing abreaction we do not speak
of gratifying the feeling abreacted; rather we speak of a feeling of relief
following its abreaction. I would submit that only experiences classified
as motivational in nature can be gratified or frustrated. It is also the case
that when we talk about motivations we talk about acting on them but
not about expressing them. But feelings are quintessentially expressed.
These semantic considerations are intended simply as an introduction to
the problem. There are weightier considerations to be explored.
The need to distinguish gratification from simple feeling bears on
the often misunderstood pleasure principle. The sheer subjective,
affective experience of pleasure or unpleasure must be distinguished
from the buildup and release of motivational tension that is inherently
pleasurable and unpleasurable. Unfortunately, the same words are used
to refer to two quite different psychological events. We would avoid
confusion if the terms frustration and gratification were applied to
motivational states and pleasure and unpleasure applied to affect
states. It would then be possible to speak of gratifying an aggressive
desire while experiencing a feeling of unpleasure (i.e., guilt). It would
be possible also to speak of frustrating an aggressive desire and feeling
pleasure (i.e., pride).
Let me now turn to a closer examination of several of these affect-
centered theories, specifically those of Kernberg and Lichtenberg.
I have quoted Kernberg as asserting that affects are the “primary
motivators of behavior.” In the sentence immediately following the one
quoted, he writes, “affects are gradually organized into libidinal and
aggressive drives, indissolubly linked to object relations from the onset
of individuation” (Kernberg l988, p. 3l9). Similarly, in a later paper
Kernberg (1992) asserts that “libidinal and aggressive drives are a hier-
archically superordinate motivational system constituted by affects
which are their ‘building blocks’ . . . ” (p. 210). For Kernberg, clearly, the
drives are secondary to affects and are in fact derived from them.
Unlike Lichtenberg, whom we will consider next, Kernberg (1978)
finds a place for an energy concept in the form of “affect cathexes,”
paradoxically sounding very much like Freud’s early idea of an “affect
charge” surrounding an idea that may be detached and transformed into
anxiety. Affective cathexes, he writes,
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that is, the quantitative element or economic factor involved in the
intensity of primitive affect dispositions, . . . are activated in the context
of primitive units of internalized object relations; affects actually are
the organizers of such primitive units. Gradually, affects differentiate,
and their quantitative or economic aspects become intimately linked
with the organization of motivational systems, or drives, into the “libido”
series and the “aggression” series. Later, affects have a crucial function
in signaling the predominant quality of libidinal, aggressive, or combined
libidinal-aggressive motivational systems. Their quantitative elements
or “cathexes” originally reflected the subjective, intrapsychic impact of
gratification or frustration of physiological needs, but gradually they
depend more and more on the subject’s total interpretation of the
immediate affective arousal in terms of its meaning for self and object,
in terms of ego values and superego pressures, etc. [pp. 339–340].
Note that it is the physiological needs, not the affects, that are
gratified or frustrated. I believe that here Kernberg is struggling with a
knotty problem—how does one leap across the mind-body gap? His
solution is worth attention. Let us parse his last sentence into its con-
stituent parts: (a) the quantitative elements or “cathexes” (i.e., affect
cathexes) derive from the “subjective impact” of (b) gratification and
frustration of (c) physiological needs. These last are clearly somatic and
biological. I am as unhappy about using terms like gratification and
frustration with respect to physiological needs as I am about using them
in connection with affects, and for this reason: there are many physio-
logical needs that have no psychological relevance. For example, we
would hesitate to say that an electrolyte imbalance is either gratified or
frustrated; rather, we would say using psychologically neutral terms,
that the need for electrolyte balance was met or unmet. These termino-
logical distinctions allow us to differentiate needs that are psychologi-
cally relevant from those that are not. But how does the individual know
which is which? Freud finessed the problem by simply asserting that
psychologically relevant needs (instincts) have their own “represen-
tative” on the psychological plane—a solution by definition. Kernberg
seems loath to go this route, however, as it would give psychologically
relevant needs a psychological status independent of affects (and of
objects as well). He finesses the problem away by treating physiological
needs as if they can be directly gratified or frustrated psychologically.
He can then go on to talk about this gratification and frustration as the
source of the “subjective impact” from which in turn the strength of the
“affect cathexes” is derived.
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Freud’s finesse was meant essentially to get beyond the purely
physiological level of needs or the biological grounding of instincts,
while leaving intact the autonomy of need, now elevated to the
psychological status of a drive or impulse. Further, Freud’s solution
provides for communication, tension, and potential conflict between the
biological source of the instinct (the physiological need) and its
“psychical representative.” Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) make the
interesting point that the implied metaphor in the term psychical
representative is that of a delegate literally representing the physical
need, as a legislator representing a district. And just as a legislator may
sometimes vote against the needs of his district or ignore them, depending
on his own inclinations or forces acting on him from his political party
or legislative colleagues, so may the “psychical representative” of an
instinct achieve a degree of autonomy because of its participation as a
mental, rather than simply as a physiological, event. Thus, as I will later
elaborate, the “psychical representative” is an active rather than passive
part of the mind.
Kernberg, in effect, reduces drive and impulse in Freud’s sense to
the level of physiological needs and then elevates these needs to the
psychological plane as affect. Since affects form affective memories
“incorporating self components, object components, and the affect state
itself” (Kernberg 1975, p. 339), one can see where he is going and why:
only by denying impulses independent psychological standing, and
considering them to be physiological needs solely, can he incorporate
self- and object relations into his theory along with the affects now
serving drive or impulse functions. Affects as dynamic entities are
essential to Kernberg if he is to achieve this end. Affects cannot be
treated simply as experiential, expressive events, nor can they be
treated as “derivatives” of drives or impulses as defined by Freud, for
then there would be too many degrees of freedom operating between
impulses and object relations.
As with Kernberg, for Lichtenberg (1988) motivations are initially
needs. “Each psychic motivational system,” he writes, “is built around
a fundamental need, and each is based on behaviors clearly observable
beginning in the neonatal period: (1) the need to fulfill physiological
requirements; (2) the need for attachment and affiliation; (3) the need
for assertion and exploration; (4) the need to react aversively through
antagonism and/or withdrawal; (5) the need for sensual and sexual
pleasure” (p. 60). In this definition, Lichtenberg includes “physiologi-
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cal requirements” along with requirements more fully psychological in
nature. But how are these to be distinguished? Lichtenberg’s answer is
in substance very much like Kernberg’s:
For each motivational-functional system, affects are central. Affects
serve as a principal means of communication between infant and care-
giver (as crying and interest and smile for attachment, hunger satiety
for physiological regulation and nonnutritive sucking pleasure for the
sensual-sexual system). Equally important, the triggering of affect that
occurs inherently with the activation of each of the perceptual-action
patterns amplifies the motivation and gives greater significance to the
functional activity” [p. 6l].
For Lichtenberg there is a hierarchy of development from the ini-
tially given “motivational-functional” systems:
Each motivational-functional system has a biological and neuro-
physiological base assuring survival. This is the “need” end of the
hierarchy. Next in the hierarchy are elemental learning schemata
which develop into increasingly complex programs of intentions and
planning. At a still higher level are wishes in the psychoanalytic sense
of symbolic representations of desires, aims, ambitions, goals, and
ideals. All three levels—need in the form of basic requirements, inten-
tions and planning in the form of perceptual-affective action patterns,
and symbolic representation of wishes—persist throughout life [p. 70].
Note how, for both Kernberg and Lichtenberg, wishes and impulses
are later and secondary developments, dependent on affects and on
what Lichtenberg refers to as “intersubjective experience,” Kernberg as
“object relations.” First we have physiological needs and innate action
patterns, and only then do we have affective experiences with caretak-
ers, out of which wishes, drives, and impulses derive secondarily, as a
function of the affective interactions with caretakers. From both
Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s point of view, we learn to wish, to desire,
to want, as a function of interactions with a caretaker or, from
Kernberg’s perspective, with the internalization of these intersubjective
experiences in the form of object relations. It is important to note that
according to Kernberg and Lichtenberg, we do not simply learn what to
wish for or desire, but we learn to wish and to want. Prior to object
relations or intersubjective experience there exist automatic physio-
logical needs or motivational-functional systems with innate action
patterns, but no desires or wishing in the strictly psychological sense.
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The biological clay of the infant is molded into desire itself in the
matrix of the intersubjective or object-relational. Parenthetically, one
could observe that desire, far from guaranteeing our autonomy from
others and from society, is instead hostage to society and to the partic-
ular object relations we happen to be born into. This is a point made by
Lionel Trilling (1971) with regard to Freud’s instinct theory.
For both Kernberg and Lichtenberg, it seems, the centrality of
object relations is what drives their theories to deny the independent
status of motivation or conation in general. As I have mentioned,
Lichtenberg draws heavily on the theories of Silvan Tomkins. For
example, the concept of affective amplification of needs, which serves
a conceptual function similar to that of “subjective impact” and “affect
cathexes” in Kernberg’s thinking, is borrowed directly from Tomkins.
In one way or another, some quantitative or dynamic factor has appar-
ently to be introduced, and that leads inevitably to an energy concept, a
subject to which we shall now turn.
REVISITING THE ENERGY CONCEPT
The indictment of the energy concept has been grounded in three objec-
tions: (1) the concept is “data distant” and impersonal and thus doesn’t
help us clinically; (2) it derives from a hydraulic and mechanical
metaphor borrowed by Freud from nineteenth-century physics and mis-
applied to psychology as a way of shoring up his claim that psycho-
analysis is a natural science; (3) the reality to which it would refer does
not exist, nor is the concept’s usefulness supported by related sciences
such as physiology. In short, the concept of psychic energy is neither
useful nor appropriate, nor does it refer to anything real. I would like to
try to defend the negative of these three indictments: the concept is both
useful and appropriate, and it likely refers to something real.
Let me start with another look at Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s posi-
tions. Because Kernberg does in fact use an economic point of view,
while Lichtenberg appears to abjure one, it should be interesting to
compare them.
Kernberg’s position involves five stages: ( l ) there are certain physio-
logically given needs; (2) these physiological needs can be gratified or
frustrated; (3) these gratifications and frustrations occur in a context of
affect experience and object relations; (4) the particular nature of these
gratifications and frustrations produces a “subjective impact” on affect
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states and gives rise to the affect-cathexes accompanying particular
object relations and governing the way in which those relations are
internalized; (5) these newly formed affect-cathexes and internalized
object relations in turn give rise to motives and impulses or, in psycho-
analytic terms, to libidinal and aggressive drives.
This schematic model is offered by Kernberg as providing the con-
ceptual tools with which to understand how narcissistic and borderline
disorders develop. Notice that the five stages in the model attempt to
account for how physiological needs become psychological motives. In
a certain sense these five steps constitute a psychological transforming
machine, not conceptually unlike the steps necessary to account for the
way in which a waterfall ends up lighting an electric bulb—a process
whereby a powerful natural force comparable to physiological need
ends up serving a purely man-made purpose comparable to the creation
of libidinal and aggressive impulses in the matrix of specific object
relations. Thus are the raw powers of nature converted to civilized uses.
The manner in which this happens is schematically defined as a series
of significant transformations.
Lichtenberg’s position can be schematized as follows: (1) in the
beginning are motivational-functional systems and associated action
patterns, biologically and neurophysiologically grounded, that
Lichetenberg refers to as needs; (2) affects amplify these needs in the
context of intersubjective experience so that these needs become sig-
nificant psychological events; (3) out of this affect amplification arise
wishes—“symbolic representations of drives, aims, ambitions, and
ideals” (1988, p. 70). Again the biologically given is transformed into
the humanly experienced: physiological needs become wishes, desires,
ambitions, goals, and ideals as a result of affect amplification and inter-
subjective experience. Here we have a transforming machine not too
dissimilar from Kernberg’s, though not explicitly based on an economic
principle. It is not, however, without a quasi-quantitative concept—
the idea of affect amplification borrowed from Tomkins. Clearly,
Lichtenberg means by amplification something more than sheer
increase. There is some qualitative change occurring from the condition
of physiological need or action pattern to that of wish, desire, etc.
In my schematic exposition of Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s mod-
els I have slipped in two ideas I must further develop. I have described
their models in terms (1) of how one step leads to another and (2) of
major transformations occurring from the first to the last step.
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We have been admonished to eschew “how” questions and that to
talk about transformations may be begging an important question: What
in psychoanalytic terms is a transformation? In place of how questions,
what some like Schafer (1976, 1988) feel are of greater interest and
importance are the reasons people give, either explicitly or implicitly,
for their actions in the broadest sense of that term: “The reason I went
to the store was to buy a dress.” “The reason I hate you is because you
always criticize me.” Or, in a more complicated vein, “The reason I
disclaim hating you and act as if I don’t is that I won’t allow myself to
feel hate toward anyone.” Or, finally, “The reason I love you consciously
is that I hate you unconsciously and want to disavow that hate.” The
strength of the action language approach proposed by Schafer is that it
cuts through the difficult problems encountered by impersonally stated
theories when dealing with agency. In both psychological schema theory
and psychoanalytic structural theory, the place of the agent is lost. Not
so in action language. The agent is always the person, the subject of the
verb, whether we are dealing with conscious or unconscious actions.
When, if ever, does the person as agent appear in Kernberg’s and
Lichtenberg’s models? Clearly, not at the first stage of physiological
needs or action patterns. At some point beyond that, the person as agent
or actor may emerge, already the fateful product of adventitiously
encountered gratifications and frustrations of biological needs and the
object relations into which the person is born. It seems odd and para-
doxical to refer to personhood and agency as products, and yet in
Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s schemata they would need to be. And, if
they are products, how does this product emerge out of the interplay of
the biological, the psychological, and the social? What reasons, in the
sense used above, can account for this development? It is hard to see
what these might be in Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s models, where
personhood or agency is in a sense granted the child by its caretakers
and how they respond to its affect expressions and physiological needs. 
Strangely, it is in Freud’s impersonal instinct theory, I believe, that
personhood is vouchsafed as a given by placing the psychical repre-
sentative of an instinct (i.e., of a physiological need) at the heart of
development. (This is likely why Trilling identified instincts as the
guarantee of individual freedom.) I am here proposing, though it is
hardly a novel idea, that instincts as psychological givens, not simply
as biological needs, are from the start of life at the core of personhood
or agency, which is consequently not a product or vicissitude of devel-
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opment, though it will certainly be affected by it. (As I will later sug-
gest, a new term is needed for this “psychical representative,” one that
captures the requisite sense of experiential immediacy. I believe that
craving is such a term.)
But no theoretical model, certainly not one of psychological develop-
ment or therapeutic change—that is, no model attempting to explain
change—can avoid accounting for the transitions (i.e., how one step or
phase leads to another). Nor can it avoid identifying, in the change from
one step to another, what is changed and what is conserved. Bear in mind
that if nothing is conserved, if nothing remains the same, we cannot speak
of development but instead must speak of revolution or of some discon-
tinuous and unrelated sequence of events. Were we to see at one time a
caterpillar and at some future time a butterfly, we would have no way of
knowing that a metamorphosis had taken place. Only by learning that an
orderly process of change, in which one organ is modified to become
another, does metamorphosis make sense. It is this conservation through
change, I suggest, that requires the positing of an energy concept. To
justify this claim, a bit of terminological history is in order.
The terms energy and force (and, secondarily, work and power)
have in our time been taken over by physics. That was not originally the
case. Like all sciences, physics borrowed its terms from the language of
everyday life. The very word energy, according to the Oxford English
Dictionary, was originally introduced into English by the poet Sidney
in 1581, who borrowed it from Aristotle. Aristotle used the term to
refer to the force or vigor of written or spoken expression. The OED
records Sidney’s first use: “That same forceableness or energia (as the
Greeks called it) of the writer.” Certainly I do not wish to overlook the
fact that these terms are to this day used in ordinary language in some-
thing of the same sense. But nowadays we cannot avoid a sense of using
the terms metaphorically or by analogy with their use in physics,
whereas we have an historical right, if you like, to use them
unmetaphorically and not by analogy. In fact, use by metaphor and
analogy goes in the other direction, from ordinary talk to physics.
The word energy, in brief, derives from the Greek word for work,
ergon, and refers to the capacity to do work, so that when Aristotle or
Sidney used the term, they had in mind that the writer or speaker, by the
application of “forcibleness” or “energy” accomplished something—that
is, a work or, as we might say, a “piece of work.” It is not accidental that
we refer to a work of art or that a musical composition is called an opus,
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the Latin word for work—they are the outcome of the “forcible”
application of “energy.” Energy, force, and work were linked together
in human experience long before modern physics. For these reasons, as
I have proposed elsewhere (Shevrin 1981), these terms should not be
abandoned simply because they have become in large measure the
property of physics, which has embedded them in “mechanical” and
“impersonal” theories. Rather, we should return to their root meaning
and see how they can be of benefit to us. I believe that this root meaning
can be expressed in this way: “Doing something actively to something
beyond its capacity to resist.” This “something” can be either physical
or mental. When we apply ourselves actively to a task and bring about
its conclusion, we have—in the root meaning of the word—worked. My
main point is that energy, force, and work are not intrinsically impersonal
and mechanical, but are naturally a part of our experience of ourselves
and of our actions and accomplishments.
Let me now apply these ideas to our problem. When a person says,
“The reason I love you consciously is that I hate you unconsciously and
want to disclaim that hate,” or when an infant’s wants or desires are
gratified and it responds with pleasure and molding itself to the caretaker,
I would contend that in both instances the individual is engaged in an
action and is at work in as fundamental a sense as when a locomotive
pulls a train. Further, in this fundamental meaning of work, the human
sense antedates the mechanical one. The actions are transformative,
involving both change and conservation. In principle, a concept of
transformative work is the only way we can begin to account for the
nature of transitions between stages or steps in a process of develop-
ment. Otherwise we are faced with stochastic, discontinuous jumps, a
kind of creation de novo with each new step, and we are left simply to
assert that one step must follow another, though we cannot account for
the transitions.
But I have with some regret just said that the concept of transfor-
mative work is in principle the only way we can account for change and
development.
On the general level, the problem is self-evident. Without such a
concept, our models of change (of any psychological variety) are dead
in the water. I might well be challenged, however, to stipulate how exactly
that concept can usefully be applied to psychic reality. Before I make a
stab at responding to the challenge, let me first offer my attempted solution
to the problem of relating affect, action, and motive as they bear on the
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issue of personhood and agency. I then hope to be in a position to see
how far I can go in explicating the possible gains in applying the concepts
of force, energy, and work to psychic phenomena.
MOTIVATIONS AS CRAVINGS AND DESIRES
As we have seen, various psychoanalytic writers and developmental
psychologists have shifted theoretical interest from motives, instincts,
and impulses as prime movers to affects and affect organization that
interact with intersubjective experience or object relationships to gen-
erate motives and agency. On the basis of an initial physiological sub-
stratum of need, the infant responds with inborn affects to gratification
and frustration of these physiological needs in the matrix of its object
relations, out of which it develops the capacity to want and desire at the
level of psychic experience. Prior to that point, we can say, the infant is
a biological organism; afterward it is a person. I have suggested that in
order to make these models work, it has to be assumed that physiologi-
cal needs can be gratified or frustrated, thus mixing two disparate lev-
els of discourse, the biological and the psychological, and creating the
problem of how to discriminate physiological needs that are psycho-
logically relevant from those that are not. This line of reasoning, I
believe, necessitates viewing the very capacity to want or desire as a
social product, with the further consequence that agency or personhood
are social products also, and so not the guarantors of individual auton-
omy. Without society and its caretaking agents, we would not desire or
want in any intrinsically psychological sense; we would be like clocks
on the mantelpiece sounding an alarm every time a physiological need
reached a certain imbalance. I believe that too much is given away by
such approaches.
When Freud took the step of abandoning his neurology for psy-
chology and posited a “psychical representative” of a biologically
grounded instinct, he left us at sea as to what that psychical representa-
tive was like. Over the course of his efforts to come to grips with the
relationship between mind and body, he changed his terminology in
order to capture more of what he felt that relationship to be.
Nevertheless, it is clear that he was never satisfied with his efforts.
Briefly, in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud (1900) speaks of the
“excitations produced by internal needs [that] seek discharge in move-
ment, which may be described as an ‘internal change’ or an ‘expression
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of emotion’” (p. 565). Already the main ideas are present, though the
terminology will change. In time “excitation” will be replaced by “psy-
chical representative” (1915a, p. 122) or “instinctual representative”
(1915b, p. 152). The latter term was intended to allow for three differ-
ent manifestations of the instinct: ideational, motoric, and affective.
Only the first of these, however, is truly representational in nature, and
as such it is the only one that can be said to exist unconsciously. The
latter two are treated as discharge phenomena caused by an instinctual
quota of energy and exist solely as dispositions to respond rather than
as active unconscious agents, a role reserved for the ideational repre-
sentative of the instinct. (Here we see Freud attempting to cope with the
phenomena of transformation by using an energy concept.) The matter
is further complicated by the role assigned by Freud to primal repres-
sion, which renders the psychical or ideational representative of an
instinct forever unconscious, so that it exists in the unconscious as a
kind of permanent undertow contributing the necessary “pull from
underneath” that causes repression proper (1912b, p. 148). Yet it is
important to stress that for Freud only the ideational representative is
an active force in the mind, not motor discharge and—of special import
to our discussion—not affect. 
How can this active agent in the mind, present from the beginning
of instinctual life, be further characterized? Clearly for Freud this agent
is motivational in nature—why else talk about its connection to
instincts? But what kind of motive is it? In an earlier paper I wrote with
Povl Toussieng (Shevrin and Toussieng l965) dealing with psychotic
children, we proposed that at the start of life infants experience crav-
ings, the earliest form of what later will develop into desires, wants, or
impulses. A craving is an intense, peremptory want, which, we further
posited, is experienced; that is, it is psychological in nature and not
simply a silent physiological imbalance. There is an additional property
of a craving as we then defined it: although it is more intense and
peremptory than any desire felt later, it lacks experiential quality in the
sense that the infant cannot tell from the craving what exactly it is that
is craved. From the side of the infant, it craves without measure and
without knowing what it wants; from the side of the caretaker, the
infant is experienced as demanding and difficult to figure out. As a
psychological event, a craving is capable of being gratified or frustrated.
Further, I would argue, it is at the core of personhood or agency; in
another terminology, it may be regarded as the first harbinger of self.
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William James, in his chapter on the consciousness of self, relates the
most basic sense of self to the “primitive and instinctual impulses of our
nature” (1890, p. 3l9). I would qualify that statement only so that the
“primitive and instinctual impulses” would be understood not as pure-
ly physiological needs or imbalances but as primitive experiences of
craving. Although Descartes may have equated agency and existence
with thought, and many contemporary psychoanalytic writers equate
them with feeling, I am proposing that in earliest infancy the Cartesian
formula should be restated as “I crave, therefore I am.” Moreover,
rather than our motives being forces external to ourselves, pushing us
into action, our motives are ourselves acting with “forcibleness” and
“energy.” A craving, protesting baby is doing no less.
What is the theoretical point of talking about cravings instead of
physiological needs? The main purpose is to make it possible to conceive
of the infant as an “I,” however primitive, whose experience of “I-ness,”
though given from the start, is nevertheless contingent (but not entirely
dependent) on gratifications and frustrations obtained in the matrix of
affect-laden intersubjective experience. These later factors, though they
will certainly determine much about how cravings fare, the quality of
their satisfactions and frustrations, and the special importance of care-
takers, will neither determine nor create the core of agency and person-
hood, as they appear to do in the Kernberg and Lichtenberg models.
A second theoretical point to emphasize the fact that affect experi-
ences, as only one set of factors determining the subsequent develop-
ment of desires, are not responsible for their very existence. That is
already guaranteed by the prior existence of cravings. But something of
vital importance is nonetheless contributed by object relations and
affect experience: the cravings, originally experienced as empty of
quality, of a sense of what the craving is about, take on their psycho-
logical qualities as sensuousness, hunger, etc. in the matrix of object
relations. It is there the infant learns what its desires are, not simply
what it is to desire. By giving the function of “psychical representative”
the psychological content of craving, we can at a single stroke, at least
theoretically, assure the independent origin of personhood and agency,
while preserving the later options of impulse development stipulated in
Kernberg’s and Lichtenberg’s models. The simplest way to put it,
which I save for last, is that psychological being is present from the
start of life; we need not account for any transition from sheer bio-
logical existence to psychological experience once life begins. Of
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course, what we do lose in this view is the idea that object relations are
the fundamental determinants of personhood and agency. I am prepared
to accept that. 
Let me now try to apply the concepts of force, energy, and work,
which I hope I have shown can be employed without risk of being
mechanical and impersonal. I will introduce one terminological change:
instead of work, which still carries a narrow physical connotation, I will
use the term effort, which encompasses mental as well as physical
work. I will qualify it with the adjective psychological.
It is not difficult to see that the longer you apply yourself to a task
of whatever sort, the more psychological effort you are exerting. Thus,
in the case of the infant at the start of life, the longer the baby craves in
the sense I have defined, the more effort the child is exerting. In that
neither infant nor caretaker can readily discern what a craving is about,
it may go on for long periods, during which the baby will be expending
considerable effort. Once cravings are replaced by desires whose quali-
ties are known by the child and readily discernible by the caretaker,
they may be gratified more quickly and with a smaller expenditure of
effort. A qualitative shift has resulted in a greater efficiency of psycho-
logical effort on the part of both infant and caretaker. But what has been
conserved? The simple answer is agency, in the sense of active person-
hood that I have equated with the psychological activity of craving.
Agency has been conserved and raised to a new level insofar as the
infant now knows what it desires, how and by whom its desires can be
met, and how long it must wait. 
An interesting implication can be drawn from this little exercise. If
cravings are not adequately gratified in a timely fashion, it is likely that
desires will not emerge or will do so unstably; when that happens, the
individual sense of agency or personhood will either be maintained at
the previous level of cravings or will be so undermined that the experi-
ence of agency is itself compromised. 
Empirical support for this conceptualization of agency as an early
motivational state or craving is provided by Dowling’s observations of
infants suffering from esophageal atresia (1977). Because of a birth
anomaly, food could not pass directly from the mouth into the stomach
for these infants. To survive they had to be fed directly by tube into the
stomach. Thus, nature has contrived cruelly here to separate the expe-
rience of hunger and satiation through oral intake from the fact of nutri-
tion itself. These infants could be fed entirely on an arbitrary schedule,
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unrelated to their experience of hunger. It happened in several cases
that a child was fed not when it cried in hunger, but when the care-
taker deemed it convenient. When no effort was made to coordinate a
sham oral feeding with direct stomach feeding (the milk or food placed
in the child’s mouth would emerge from the side of the throat), the
experience of hunger was totally separated from physiological satiation
and striking and dramatic developmental difficulties ensued. Dowling
noted in these children a “lack of consistent intentionality in interaction
with the environment” (p. 2l9). One child would become “restless and
intermittently fussy, but never forcefully and recognizably hungry”
(p. 22l). This lack of demand and interest extended to all major phases
of early development involving gross musculature, like crawling and
walking. Language development was generally normal, but often words
were not used to make wants known. Escalona, as quoted by Dowling,
described Monica at thirty-four months, the earliest recorded case of
esophageal atresia:
In view of the occasional delicacy of eye-hand coordination, it is as if
the child were able to do better but just did not care enough or declined
to make the effort which would result in greater success. . . . The above
observation implies that the primitive or retarded nature of Monica’s
behavior may in part be referable to a lack of “motivation” rather than
a lack of “ability.” (These terms are here used loosely—hence the quo-
tation marks.) Many aspects of Monica’s behavior (and history) sug-
gest that there is a weakness or defect in connection with normally
present impulses for action and sources of gratification [pp. 19–20].
In these infants, the experience of hunger as a craving was in fact
undermined, and the child’s capacity for agency, for intentional action,
appeared grossly impaired. Note that its physiological need was met by
the caretaker, in several cases in the context of warm and responsive
mothering, but that if this mothering was not coordinated with its state
of craving, a significant developmental anomaly in the capacity for
agency resulted, no matter how loving the caretaker. For these infants,
their psychological “forcibleness” and “energy” were gone.
In a formal conceptual sense the same considerations apply to
transformations in level of organization occurring during treatment. It
is not unusual for a patient to be in an intensely anxious state brought
on by unconscious claims on the analyst that the latter can hear as
clearly as one hears a baby crying in the night, though the precise nature
of the claims may be as difficult to identify. Then at a certain point the
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patient produces a fantasy or dream that clarifies for both the nature and
meaning of the claims. From a formal standpoint, the condition of con-
flicted unconscious claims is akin to a state of craving marked by an
enormous expenditure of psychological effort caused by the intensity
and duration of the infant’s claim. The shift to a fantasy is comparable
to the developmental transformation from craving to desire. The fantasy
often makes far clearer what the nature of the claim is and what makes
it so conflictual. The expenditure of psychological effort is markedly
reduced, and agency is raised to a new level of mastery. It is also worth
noting that in the older child and the adult this formal regression to a
state of craving is produced by repression, which prevents either patient
or analyst from knowing the specific quality of the claim. At the same
time, this formal regression to a state of craving at the level of neurosis
needs to be distinguished from severe developmental arrests at the
craving level, a condition found in addicts.
RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Recent findings in two areas of research—(1) neurophysiology of
addiction and (2) the psychophysiology of early oral gratification—
have direct bearing on my thesis.
Addiction is usually considered to be an extreme pathological form
of pleasure seeking, a condition in which nothing else matters but to
achieve through the drug a state of bliss, no matter how ephemeral. This
view of addiction should gladden the hearts of affect-first theoreticians,
because it clearly implies that it is the desired affect state that drives, or
motivates, the addictive behavior. Motivation appears to be derived
from the affect, not the other way around.
Recent research by Berridge and Robinson (1995) demonstrates
quite otherwise. Their investigations show that there are neuronal
systems underlying wanting or craving that are quite independent of
neuronal systems underlying liking or enjoying. This suggests that it
is not the pleasure involved in drug use that drives the behavior;
rather, it is this separate craving system that drives the behavior in
the absence of pleasure. “The neural systems . . . most sensitized by
drugs . . . ,” write these authors, “normally mediate a specific motiva-
tional process we call ‘wanting’. . . . This psychological process is not
‘liking’ or pleasure, nor is it directly experienced in conscious
awareness” (p. 72).
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The brain systems most likely involved in this state of wanting or
craving are the mesotelenchephalic dopamine systems, which show
“robust sensitization after repeated exposure to drugs such as ampheta-
mine, cocaine, or heroin” (p. 72). Berridge and Robinson point out that
measures of liking and wanting have been confounded in most previous
research. They have succeeded in separating these two systems by
massively depleting forebrain dopamine through lesions that destroy
only dopamine-containing neurons. The result was that appetite was
eliminated, but that pleasant and unpleasant responses were retained.
However, electrical stimulation of these same dopamine systems resulted
in feeding with no increase or decrease in pleasant or unpleasant
responses. The absence of wanting did not affect liking; nor did the
presence of wanting affect liking. They functioned as two independent
but coordinate systems, neither derived from the other.
I suggest that these findings do not fit with the Kernberg-
Lichtenberg-Tompkins theory that motivation derives from affect
states, but rather support my ideas that cravings are there from the start
and are independently powerful (Shevrin and Toussieng 1965).
Let me now turn to research on the psychophysiology of early oral
gratification. Again it is important to bear in mind that the affect-first
thesis is based on the premise that the affective response of infant to
caretaker serves to mediate physiological need reduction, which then
gives rise to various motivations. We have already seen that physio-
logical need is subserved by a neuronal system having psychological
relevance as wanting or craving. Now I will cite evidence demonstrating
that the developmental benefits of oral gratification are quite independent
of other caretaking modalities, such as holding or cuddling, and bear a
significant relationship to Dowling’s findings on esophageal atresia.
Zeifman, Delaney, and Blass (1994) have reported that when
newborn infants are given sucrose their heart rate will diminish and
they will stop crying, markedly reduce gross activity, and bring their
hands to their mouths. From previous research with rat pups, these
authors were able to trace this calming effect to the activation of
endogenous opiodes. When opiodes were counteracted with naxolone,
the calming effect disappeared. Interestingly, in human newborns this
absence of calming effect was found in the babies of mothers who
during pregnancy were on methadone, another substance that depletes
endogenous opiodes. The point I want to make is that significant
calming can be produced in the newborn entirely through an act of
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oral gratification; in fact, this can be done (but should not be) without a
caretaker present.
But the story begins to change with two- and four-week-old infants.
With two-week-old infants the amount of sucrose needs to be increased
fivefold for most of the same effects to be achieved. But it is with the
four-week-olds that a remarkable change occurs. In the four-week-olds
sucrose will have the same effects as in two-week-olds, but only when
eye contact is maintained with the infant. Neither eye contact alone nor
sucrose alone will result in calming. The authors conclude that “four
weeks of age may be a transition period from calming by nonsocial
proximate stimulation such as sweet taste, to calming by specific, distal
social interactions with parents or caretakers” (p. 1098). For a period of
some four weeks, that is, the human infant can be calmed by satisfying
its cravings without the necessary presence of caretaker-infant
engagement. But by about four weeks the satisfaction of the infant’s
cravings can occur only in the context of such engagement. To be sure,
simply holding the baby, no matter how warmly or closely while
engaging its gaze, is not enough to produce calming; this activity must
be accompanied by the gratification of a craving. For the purpose in
question, an object relationship is not essential in the first month, but
then becomes coordinately necessary.
These results support the view that we are born with powerful
cravings that assert our agency well before any affect is aroused by an
object relationship. Addiction research supports the view that these
cravings are independent of affect and exert a powerful effect on
behavior. The esophageal atresia observations support the view that if
the satisfaction of cravings is dissociated from the simple meeting of
physiological needs, even in the context of an object relationship, dis-
orders of motivation will result. The Kernberg-Lichtenberg thesis is not
supported by these findings.
CONCLUSION
I believe that I have been able to show, both from a theoretical standpoint
and by adducing relevant research evidence, that any theory based on
considering affect and object relations as primary, and motivation as
secondary, is subject to serious theoretical difficulties and is contradicted
by research evidence. Rather, it is motivation from the start of life that
constitutes the origin of agency, independent of object relations. Affects
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are not the primary motivators of behavior, as asserted by Kernberg. Nor
does motivation draw its power from the affect it triggers, as asserted
by Lichtenberg. Motivation as craving is independently powerful; it is
the mental agency that both represents and responds to the demands
made on the mind by instinct or physiological need.
The theory proposed here leads to some new questions: (1) If Freud
is correct in surmising that the earliest psychical representative (or
craving) is subject to primal repression, then is the craving infant in a
state of psychological unconsciousness? In other words, does it have
psychological being but of an entirely unconscious kind? (2) If so, then
at what point does consciousness as such arise? At one month of age, as
suggested by the sucrose feeding research ? At the point at which, as
suggested by Freud, an identity of perception yields to an identity of
thought? (3) What clinical implications, if any, follow from these con-
siderations? An attempt will be made to pursue these questions in sub-
sequent papers.
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